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The issues of privatization (and sometimes deregulation) have been reviewed in a large 
literature on the various aspects of privatization, that has emphasized the potential efficiency 
gains. Hence, the goal of this paper is twofold: First to provide some theoretical reasoning 
why privatization is useful as well as profitable for an economy and second to empirically 
present the extent of privatization in Austria and other European Union countries. Therefore, 
the reasons why privatization is necessary are elaborated. Then the specific pattern 
privatization proceeds for Austria relative to other EU and OECD countries is presented. 
Moreover, some important idiosyncratic extensions for the Austrian case are elaborated. We 
argue that in the Austrian case, any discussion of privatization cannot be reduced to observing 
cash flows, the employment performance and the stock-exchange ratings of the privatized 
formerly stateowned enterprises. Since polito-economic aspects relating to income 
distribution and ideology play an important role in explaining the way, the extent, the speed 
and the economic effects of privatization, they have to be considered as well. 
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1. Introduction 
Privatization has been a key element of structural policy reforms in most 
European Union countries including Austria during the last decade. 
Governments undertaking privatization have pursued a variety of objectives: 
achieving gains in economic efficiency, given the extensive prevalence of poor 
economic performance of public enterprises in many countries and limited 
success with their reform; and improving the fiscal position, particularly in 
cases where governments have been unwilling or unable to continue to finance 
deficits in the public enterprise sector. In addition, budgetary-constrained 
governments, facing fiscal pressures have sometimes privatized mainly for the 
reason to finance fiscal deficits with the privatization proceeds.  
The issues of privatization (and sometimes deregulation) have been reviewed 
in a large literature on the various aspects of privatization, that has emphasized 
the potential efficiency gains.
1 Hence, the goal of this paper is twofold: First to 
provide some theoretical reasoning why privatization is useful as well as 
profitable for an economy and second to empirically present the extent of 
privatization in Austria and other European Union countries. Therefore, in 
section 2, the reasons why privatization is necessary are elaborated. Then, in 
part 3, the specific pattern privatization proceeds for Austria relative to other 
EU and OECD countries is presented. Section 4 elaborates on some 
idiosyncratic extensions for the Austrian case. Finally, in part 5, a short 
summary of these findings and some policy conclusions are given. In the   -3-
Austrian case, any discussion of privatization cannot be reduced to observing 
cash flows, the employment performance and the stock-exchange ratings of the 
privatized formerly state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Polito-economic aspects 
relating to income distribution and ideology play an important role in 
explaining the way, the extent, the speed and the economic effects of 
privatization and have to be considered as well. 
2. Reasons for Privatizing Public Enterprises 
For at least the last century, economists have employed a positive economic 
theory to explore the implications of profit maximization by private firms 
operating in private property contexts. Only since the late 1960’s have 
empirical studies been undertaken dealing with the behavior of publicly 
operated firms.
2 Since then a large number of studies of a variety of activities 
of public or private enterprises now exists and their main focus is the question 
of how public firms differ from their private equivalents. 
Basically two approaches are employed. The first, explored in part 2.1, is the 
property rights approach. It concentrates on the differences in the ease of 
captureability of economic surplus of a resource and the rights to direct an 
asset’s use, alter its from or transfer its claims among existent and potential 
owners. In short, this approach explores the differences in incentives between 
public and private agencies caused by variation in the ability of owners to 
monitor management and the problems that emerge when the goals of 
“owners” and their agents, “managers”, diverge.
3) The second one is called   -4-
“Public Choice approach” (elaborated in part 2.2) and concentrates on political 
coalitions and their effect on input usage and reward and/or product 
characteristics. The Public Choice approach also includes the theory of 
bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1971, 1975).  
2.1. The Property Rights Approach 
The property rights approach points out one crucial difference between private 
and public firms. The practical difficulties in transferring ownership rights 
among individuals in the public sector and the relative ease of such transactions 
with private assets which includes, of course, the ability of owners (citizens) to 
monitor their agents (elected officials’ and bureaucrats’) behaviour. Up to now, 
this approach pioneered by Armen Alchian is well known, but it is useful to 
recall his predictions: government managers will not organize the inputs under 
their direction in such a way, as to maximize the wealth of the tentative 
owners, the general citizenry. Alchian predicts, therefore, that public firms will 
be less efficient, their management will enjoy “quieter lives” and because of 
this the public will give them lower levels of discretion then their colleagues in 
private firms. To put it in another way, the property rights approach is 
concerned with any type of cooperation in which ownership and management 
fall apart. The arising principal-agent problem may be virulent in private 
enterprises as well, but to a much lesser extent! Numerous studies have been 
undertaken, which have tested this proposition and the results that public 
enterprises are less efficient then private ones, is confirmed in most of them.
4)    -5-
To sum up the results so far: the property rights approach seems to indicate that 
(1) private production is cheaper than production in publicly owned and 
managed firms and (2) given sufficient competition between public and private 
producers (and no discriminative regulations and subsidies) the differences in 
unit cost turn out to be insignificant. From this, one may conclude that it is not 
so much the difference in the transferability of ownership but the lack of 
competition which leads to the often observed and less efficient production in 
public enterprises. 
2.2. The Public Choice Approach 
The public choice approach appears to provide a broader analysis than the 
property rights one. The public choice approach assumes that politicians, 
bureaucrats, managers of public enterprises are selfish utility maximizers 
subject to constraints.
5) In this approach it is, f.e. for a politician, assumed that 
he acts selfish in order to reach his ideological or personal goals under the 
constraint not to loose the next election. As for a politician to stay in power is 
the most important constraint (or even sometimes a goal), he will also use 
public utilities for his own selfish goals. One reason for this is evidently the 
lack of incentives for politicians and tax payers to exert effective control of an 
efficient use of public enterprises or resources in the economy. This argument 
seems especially valid for the case of public utilities or enterprises. Public 
utilities offer excellent opportunities to reach the selfish re-election goals of 
governments like an additional employment and the stabilization of purchasing   -6-
power of certain regions.
6) If such a “misuse” of public utilities or enterprises 
leads to full employment and higher income at least for a certain time span than 
it is easier for a government to win an election without such a “misuse” of 
public utilities. The costs of such popular policies can be made invisible for 
several years (or even 1 or 2 legislative periods) as the deficits of the public 
enterprises can be hidden in the general budget deficit.  
As the public choice approach is more concerned with micro-economic 
aspects, De Alessi claims that public managers are growth and not wealth 
orientated. He argues and finds supporting evidence that this leads to larger 
staffs and higher capital labor ratios since excess capital makes managers and 
their are subordinates’ productivity appear higher to their monitoring agents, 
the legislature. Already Borcherding, Busch and Spann (1977) argue that 
public employees effectively coalesce through their organizations and 
“capture” civil service commissions over time, altering rules in such a way that 
effective suppliers competing labor to public firms becomes less wage elastic 
than a free market buyer would otherwise face. This public employee market 
power is enhanced, they claim, by the fact that public service employees 
contribute to the election of the ultimate “bosses”, definitely not an option for a 
private sector union. In some sense then, public employees can alter the 
position of the derived demand schedule for their services by (a) “nudging” the 
final demand schedule for public services to the right and (b) specifying rules 
which lower both the elasticity of substitution between themselves and rival 
factors and the elasticity of supply of these close substitutes. Both (a) and (b)   -7-
will tend to raise wages, but they may raise employment too, since, in effect, 
the budget and tie-in effects may offset the usual substitution effects one might 
derive from the neoclassical models of labor demand in the presence of a 
simple monopoly. De Alessi (1974) in another paper argues that given the 
relative loose monitoring of public enterprises by the political review 
authorities, a rational position for the latter given the gain-sharing results of 
assiduous monitoring, managers will indulge their taste for security rather more 
than in private firms. He finds evidence consistent with the risk-avoiding 
hypothesis. Public managers’ tenures are more secure, of a longer duration, and 
their fluctuations in real wages are lower than their private counterparts.  
In conclusion, according to the public choice scholars, governmental agencies 
and firms have distinct biases leading to higher production costs, just as the 
property rights literature suggests, but excessive outputs as well. The latter 
obtains because the bureaucracy can affect demand more readily under 
monopoly public ownership by the strength of its members’ votes and/or 
lobbying efforts. The absence of a civil service and the constraint on strong 
unions by more competitive types of supply, public or private, is thought to 
reduce the ability of members of such bureaucracies to offer their services to 
the legislature on disadvantageous terms compared to potential competitors. On 
the other hand, the bureaucracy is not likely to have sole “capture” rights over 
the bureaus, but share the ownership claims with other interests.    -8-
To sum up this part, the public choice approach not only recognizes the 
differences in behavior between publicly owned and managed firms and private 
ones due to the limited transferability of ownership. It also considers the likely 
oversupply of public services due to the lack of competition in their provision 
and production. This oversupply is then quite often used for selfish re-election 
goals of politicians and can result in higher employment and higher wages in 
certain regions for a certain time.
7 
2.3 Summary of Main Findings 
If one summarizes the two approaches one clearly comes to the result that as 
already said in the introduction, there are various reasons to privatize public 
utilities or enterprises in order to stop the misuse of such policies. Even if one 
strictly denies that single firms are more efficient than their public counterparts 
one it is generally acknowledged that private enterprises are more successful 
on average and in the long term, since they tend to act in a more innovative 
fashion and as a rule enter into foreign trade relations earlier than their public 
counterparts.
8 Seen on the whole, one should start from the prior that the 
government should not have a stake in firms (Austrian Parliament, 2000). In 
the next section we will investigate to what extent privatization have occurred 
in the European Union and in Austria.   -9-
3. The Amount of Privatization in the European Union and in Austria 
3.1. Does Austria keep pace with wide privatization in OECD Countries?
9 
This paper mainly focuses on privatization in Austria. However, privatization 
has not only been relevant in the Austrian case, but has also been a key element 
of structural reform in many other developing and transition economies during 
the last decade, especially in Germany, Korea, Italy, Norway and the Czech 
Republic (OECD 2002, p. 44). Hence, privatization and proceeds from 
privatization have been substantial all over the world. Hence, the performance 
of Austria as a small open economy is assessed in the following with reference 
to the average privatization performance of other OECD countries. Since the 
beginning of the 80s, numerous privatization efforts in market oriented 
industrial countries, but also in transition and developing countries, have taken 
place. European countries appeared to be particularly involved in divestitures. 
Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 2001, p. 20, document that Austria, Spain, 
France, Germany and Italy have implemented from 40 to 80 privatization 
operations during the period 1977-1999. However, Austria with its 40 
operations is at the lower bound of this sample. According to Siegmund (1998), 
100000 large public utilities have been privatized between 1980-1996 and 
more than 500,000 small and medium sized public enterprises (see Table 3.1).  
- Table 3.1 about here - 
These privatizations are lower bound figures as privatization of financial 
institutions, interstate utilities are not counted here. Considering table 3.1 one   -10-
clearly sees that obviously the largest share of privatization has taken place in 
transformation countries over the period 1990-1996. In figure 3.1 the revenues 
from privatizations between 1990-1998 for the 15 European Union, OECD and 
other countries are shown. In total, privatization proceeds of 22.9 billions USD 
occurred in the year 1990, which rose to 153.8 millions USD in the year 1997 
and for the first time they decreased to 114.5 millions USD in the year 1998. 
The privatization proceeds (revenues) of the 15 European Union countries were 
in the year 1990 15.7 billions USD and rose to 66.6 billions USD in the year 
1997, with a decline to 58.6 billions USD in the year 1998. A detailed picture 
of the privatization proceeds of single countries is given in Table 3.2.  
- Table 3.2 about here -  
In the beginning of the 1990s a real wave of privatization began to develop. In 
most countries the wave peaked in the second part of the 1990s. Austria, for 
example, obtained proceeds from privatization in 1990/91 of only $80 million, 
but in 1996/97 it reached a peak of $3.9 billion. Germany started with proceeds 
of $325 million in 1990/91, but obtained $14.3 billion in 1996/97. An 
exception is the United Kingdom, where in 1990/91 already a peak of 
privatization proceeds had been reached ($34.7 billion). But also the later 
revenues from privatization have been substantial. This might not at least be 
due to the „right-wing” character of the Thatcher regime and can be explained 
by a partisan approach to privatization, as argued later on in section 4.   -11-
If one considers standardized figures of privatization of state-owned enterprises 
as a percentage of GDP in the year 2000 (column 9 of Table 3.2), the figures 
presented there cover a wide range. Apart from Hungary, which was a non-
market economy with a large state sector, it is Portugal which has reached by 
far the highest amount of privatization proceeds over the period, namely 20.2% 
of GDP in 2000. Considering some developed OECD countries, New Zealand 
reaches 13.9%, followed by Greece with 8.8%, Italy with 8.2% and Ireland 
with 7.2%. However, the total amount of privatization in Austria over the years 
1990 to 2000 as a percentage of GDP is relatively low and clearly below the 
average performance of the EU15. 
If one looks at the highest amounts of privatization proceeds during the 1990s, 
Italy ranks first with $98 billion, followed by Australia with $79 billions, by 
France with $74 billions, the United Kingdom with $64 billion and Japan with 
$61 billion. Austria is ranked at a disappointing number 15 out of 27 countries.  
In general, Table 3.2 clearly shows that privatization in OECD countries of the 
Eastern and Western type was a major issue in the 1990s, but less than average 
so in Austria. 
A special method of privatization is through public share offerings. In Table 
3.3, some additional figures for a longer time perspective and for a special 
privatization issue, namely privatization of state-owned enterprises through 
public share offerings, are given. 
- Table 3.3 about here -   -12-
Over the years 1961-2000, the largest amount of privatization of state-owned 
enterprises through measures like public share offerings happened in Japan 
with $146 billion, followed by Great Britain with $98 billion, by Italy with $85 
billions and France with $84 billions. According to this very long-term 
criterion, Austria is only ranked seventeenth out of eighteen countries. 
Germany had only an amount of $46 billions of privatization proceeds of state-
owned enterprises through public-share offerings. Strikingly, Austria keeps its 
second last rank. Finally, the issue size per country for all privatizations and 
the time span 1990-1999 is displayed in the last column of Table 3.3. 
According to this criterion, Austria improves its performance a little bit, but 
still shows below-average performance. In general, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 clearly 
demonstrate that privatization was a major issue, especially in the 1990s. 
However, Austria’s performance was clearly below average independent on the 
exact criterion. 
Moreover, in Table 3.4 the number and names of enterprises, which were 
privatized through public share offerings over the much shorter period 1990-
2000 are shown. Among them are mostly banks, air lines, telecom and energy 
plants. With respect to the number of privatizations which are not necessarily 
positively correlated with privatization proceeds (see section 4), Austria is 
ranked sixth out of eighteen countries. 
- Table 3.4 about here -    -13-
Seen on the whole, Austria has not kept pace with wide privatization in OECD 
countries. 
3.2 Privatization in Small Open Economies 
If one considers eleven small open economies in Europe, the results presented 
in Table 3.5 and in Figure 3.1 emerge.  
- Table 3.5 and Figure 3.1 about here -  
Table 3.5 shows that the amount of privatization was quite moderate at the 
beginning of the 90s with the exception of Belgium. The Belgium government 
privatized in the year 1993 public utilities and got proceeds of 956 millions 
USD, which are roughly 30% of all privatization proceeds of the small open 
economies in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.1. The second highest privatization 
proceeds in this year come from the Netherlands with 780 millions USD, 
followed by Portugal, which had a quite ambitious privatization program over 
the years 1993-1998, with privatization proceeds over 12 billions USD over the 
1993-1998. A lot of well known public utilities in Portugal have been 
privatized like the power plant EDP, the highway system BRISA and cement 
factories ZINPOR. Also in Austria the privatization proceeds have been quite 
large. In the year 1998 in Austria the government privatized firms with 
proceeds of 2.94 billions USD. In Austria the selling of 25% share of the public 
telecom was the biggest deal, where proceeds of 2.33 billions USD have been 
achieved. Starting with rank 7 in 1993, Austria improved its performance in 
percent of total privatization proceeds in small open economies steadily with a   -14-
peak in 1997 and at the end of the sample ranges at number three out of  eleven 
small open economies. However, one should not overemphasize this pattern, 
since also in general the amount of privatization proceeds in small open 
economies increased over 1993-1998. In the year 1993 it was 3.26 billions 
USD and in the year 1998 20.246 billions USD.  
In Figure 3.1, the privatization proceeds of small open economies are shown in 
relation to GNP. One clearly realizes the dominant position of Portugal over 
time, followed by the Netherlands and Belgium which display enormous 
privatization proceeds in the years 1993 and 1995. In Austria, we have 
privatization proceeds in percent of GDP over the years which amount to the 
average of the small open economies under consideration. However, we cannot 
detect any systematic correlation between the degree of openness of an 
economy and its privatization intensity. In general, this makes external impacts 
on the speed and intensity less plausible of privatization. However, we will 
show in section 4 that this was not the case for Austria. At most, the 
(announcement of) the launch of the euro seems to have speeded up the 
privatization wave in Europe. In general, one realizes that the privatization 
issue and the proceeds from privatization have been a considerable and policy 
relevant issue in the 90s also for the small open economies.  
3.3. Privatization in Austria 
Among those industrialized countries now awaiting further privatization, 
Austria is a special one characterized by historically strong interventions of   -15-
government. Large parts of the manufacturing and the electricity sector had 
been nationalized after world war II, in part to safeguard the country’s 
economic independence after German occupation and in part in order to 
finance the resurrection of destroyed large-scale industries. Jointly with public 
ownership in telecommunication, transport, and banking this generated one of 
the largest public sectors in Europe.
10 Seen on the whole, Austria’s economy 
has been characterized by a relative important state-owned industry, a lack of 
own capital funds due to the comparatively small company size, and a 
predominantly bank-based investment system. In 1998, Austria was 
characterized by 17 percent market capitalization relative to GDP, i.e. an even 
lower valuation ratio than Italy (30 percent) and Germany (39 percent) 
(Boutchkova and Megginson, 2000, p. 9, Table III). The globalization and 
Austria’s accession to the EU have revealed the structural problems of this 
system. Those sectors of the Austrian economy which have been protected 
from international competition like, above all, telecommunication, energy 
supply and food industries had to be integrated in the internal market. As a 
consequence, restructuring programs have recently been launched focusing on 
liberalization and privatization of Austria’s economy. In addition, joining the 
European Union represented a structural break for Austria with respect to the 
incentives to delay necessary deregulation and privatization because it was now 
much less attractive to use public utilities and industries for re-election 
purposes.
11   -16-
The Austro-Keynesian era of stabilization policy which lasted from the 
beginning of 70s to the mid 80s can be viewed as an attempt of “direct 
employment policy” in the public utilities and the public industrial sector, 
mainly in the basic (e.g. steel) machinery and chemical industry. In a sense, 
relatively large budget deficits and a s continuously increasing debt-to-GDP 
ratio have in the past often been excused by pointing at the fight against 
unemployment. The primary goal of this type of short-term policy in private 
goods markets was to stabilize employment and real income in the nationalized 
industry and, by means of the Austria specific inter-industrial relations and the 
multiplier process, in the private sector as well. To achieve this political target 
various steps were taken by the public management: the maintenance of the 
greatest possible level of production in the face of diminishing prices and 
demand; the greatest possible hoarding of employees even in situations when 
rationalization measures (dismissals) were required (resulting in 
unemployment on the job); an over-dimensioned propensity to invest 
(primarily with regard to the income effect of investment); an expansionist 
wage and fringe benefits policy with respect to buying power (causing high 
labor costs); and the financing of the firms’ deficits out of the federal budget. 
With regard to the social and re-election problems arising from unemployment 
and low incomes, the direct employment policy in public industrial firms 
intended to smooth the inevitable adjustment process to the rising requirements 
of global competitiveness in the long run. Naturally the pursued type of 
stabilization policy immediately caused substantial effects on the public   -17-
industrial firms’ productivity, thriftiness and profitability, thus reducing 
international competitiveness and augmenting deficits in the short run 
(Nowotny, 1982). Nonetheless, production and employment could not be 
maintained permanently at a high level, because the rationalization measures 
could not be postponed any longer. Since the mid 80s, the Austro-Keynesian 
stabilization policy has been increasingly criticized for what concerns its long-
term efficacy. Finally, the troubling rise of the financial losses of the state-
owned firms in the iron and steel, chemical, machinery and vehicle industry 
caused a turn in public opinion and economic policy. The amount of subsidies 
to public industrial firms covering the deficits and financing investment was 
limited to a fixed total and to the period until 1989. This change of policy 
emerged when the government realized that, due to the critique of the 
opposition, mass media and private entrepreneurs as well as to the people’s 
fear of tax increases, a majority of voters would not tolerate any longer further 
subsidies to public industrial firms. In this sense, the repercussion from the 
voter to the government worked quite well in Austria. Prior to this change of 
mind politicians had formed coalitions with the management of the relatively 
big and locally concentrated public firms in order to secure the subsidies which 
rendered inefficiencies possible and served the local constituency. Moreover 
there have been powerful shop stewards who were at the same time members 
of the legislating National Council and therefore succeeded in financing the 
expansionist enterprise policy out of the federal budget.   -18-
From the end of the 80s there was a turn around in the Austrian policy with 
respect to the public industrial sector and public utilities. Not only took place 
quite a considerable privatization in the 90s but also these enterprises where 
much less used for re-election purposes partly due to the fact that - as stressed 
already above - after joining the European Union and the deregulation of 
former monopolies into competitive markets it was much less attractive to use 
the public utilities and industries for re-election purposes. In the 90s the 
privatization of Austrian state owned industrial firms and state owned utilities 
has reached over the period 1993-1998 over 6 billions USD (compare figure 
3.3). These dramatic changes in Austrian policies which gained momentum at 
the midst of the nineties let some authors even speak of “New Austrian Public 
Policies” (see, e.g., Clemenz, 1999, p. 1). Although a substantial privatization 
took place, the privatization potential in Austria is still quite large. In most 
cases, the Austrian government kept substantial shares of partly privatized 
enterprises. Considering the federal, the state and community level and 
including all public utilities, there is a privatization potential of 45 billion Euro 
from which the federal government owns 62%, the city or state of Vienna 13%, 
all other states (e.g. Upper and Lower Austria) 14% and the communes 
(without Vienna) 11%. The latest privatization proceeds of the federal 
government over the years 1999 up to 2001 are presented in table 3.6. 
– Table 3.6 about here -    -19-
In the year 1999 a part of the Austrian tobacco (9.4%) has been privatized, 
which brought 6.8 billions Euro. On 28 February 2000, the Austrian Federal 
Government authorized the Minister of Finance to issue the privatization 
mandate to the ”Österreichische Industrieholding AG” (OeIAG), the Republic 
of Austria’s holding and privatization agency at the annual general meeting on 
17 May 2000. In accordance with the mandate, OeIAG was required to transfer 
100% of the following companies or interests in companies to completely new 
shareholders, strategic partners or the general public: Österreichische 
Staatsdruckerei GmbH, Dorotheum GmbH, Print Media Austria AG, Flughafen 
Wien AG, Österreichische Postsparkasse AG, Telekom Austria AG, and 
Austria Tabak AG. 
In carrying out this privatization mandate in the interests of the Austrian 
people, the OeIAG had to “ … obtain the maximum revenue possible, taking 
into consideration the companies' and Austria's interests” (OeIAG, 2003). It is 
important to note that the OeIAG depends on the instructions issued by the 
Republic of Austria. A second phase was envisaged at that time which involves 
examining the possibility of even further privatization. In the meantime, the 
OeIAG has already privatized further companies or parts of companies like 
Österreichische Staatsdruckerei GmbH, Dorotheum GmbH, Flughafen Wien 
AG (17.4%), Österreichische Postsparkasse AG, Austria Tabak AG, Print 
Media Austria AG, and Telekom Austria in compliance with the privatization 
mandate of the Federal Government. In the year 2000 100% of the postal bank 
has been privatized and the proceeds were 970 millions Euro. Also 24% of the   -20-
state owned Telecom utility has been privatized with the proceeds of 763 
millions Euro via an initial public offering. In sum in the year 2000 1.742 
millions Euro of privatization proceeds have been achieved. In the year 2001 
41.1% of the Austrian tobacco state owned utility has been privatized, which 
brought privatization proceeds of 582.2 millions Euro. In sum, over the years 
1999-2001 2.455 billions Euro privatization proceeds have been achieved. This 
is quite sizeable and helped the Austrian government to reduce the federal debt. 
However, some Austria-specific features deserve significantly more attention.
12 
 
3.4 Economic Consequences of Privatization in Austria 
For Austria, aggregate productivity gains have not primarily come from inter-
sectoral resource shifts. The contribution of these shifts between 2-digit SIC 
sectors to aggregate productivity change is quite small for Austria.
13 Hence, a 
further promising candidate of explaining movements in the Austrian 
productivity time series is ownership respectively privatization. Both, the 
microeconomic and case study data are supportive of the positive effects of 
privatization over time on growth and employment (see, e.g., Davis et al. 2000, 
Megginson and Netter, 2001). These results reflect geographical diversity and 
are representative of a range of privatization experience in developing and 
transition economies. They hold for the European Union countries, but are less 
pronounced for transition and developing countries. The microeconomic 
evidence indicates that private firms are operationally more efficient then 
those, held by the state, particularly in competitive industries.
14 A strong   -21-
correlation is also found for European Union countries between privatization 
and growth. However, and consistent with the growth literature, privatization is 
likely surveying as a proxy in the regressions for one or more missing variables 
that may proudly be characterized as a favorable regime change. Public 
enterprises often seek to maintain employment, and benefit from staff budget 
constraints. Consequently, there is a concern that privatization may lead to 
increased unemployment.
15 Also empirical evidence suggests that aggregate 
unemployment tends to decrease following privatization (although an 
identification problem might arise with respect to Austria due to the fact that 
country’s period of main privatization efforts is superimposed by its EU entry). 
However, particular groups of workers may still be adversely effected. In 
general, there are good theoretical reasons for privatization and that the 
proceeds from privatization, if used in a clever fashion in the areas of 
education, technology and infrastructure, can increase the welfare of such 
countries. However, is this generally positive picture also applicable to the 
Austrian case? 
What are the economic consequences from the privatization program for the 
Austrian Economy from 1990 on? It should first be mentioned that in the same 
period, i.e. together with the privatization a considerable amount of EU 
deregulation and liberalization (telecom-, gas-, electricity- and other service 
(…) markets) initiatives took place. Due to the upcoming of competitive 
markets in these areas and due to the gained efficiency of the privatized 
enterprises first considerable price reductions could be observed and second an   -22-
additional growth of 0.1 – 0.32% per year took place over the period 1996 to 
2001.
16 The origin of this additional growth was due to price reductions in the 
telecom-(-25%), gas-(-12%), electricity- (-13%)
17 sector resulting in cheaper 
input factors for the users and increased purchasing power for the consumers. 
In case of the partly privatized Austrian Telekom, solely the stifled competition 
and the EU directive to the observed effects on prices and the quality of output. 
Such an analysis is only to a limited extend possible for the now totally 
privatized VOEST, a steel mill, which today works in a totally different 
surrounding, compared to 1985, when it was a 100% public enterprise. Here it 
does not make much sense to show the figures (e.g. turn over, profit, etc.) of 
this firm, which in former times disposed of totally different products and a 
production technology than today. Hence, we refrain from giving current 
realizations of performance measures and only feel legitimized to convey a 
rough indicator of performance of Voestalpine Stahl AG for the time span 
1993-1997. The operating income rose from a 71 million ATS deficit to 3.2 
billion ATS profits in 1997. However, even this impressive increase in 
performance cannot be attributed to a change in ownership rights in the sense 
of a statistically corroborated causality relationship (Nowotny, 1998, p. 43).  
However, there are additional reasons why one should be very careful and not 
over-emphasize the above results. One reason is that the choice of firms for 
privatization has been far from random which might lead to an upward bias, i.e. 
to better than average performance results from privatization (Carlin et al., 
2001, p. 3). Second, the effect of an ownership change might be quite different   -23-
for different performance measures. Third, there might be additional influences 
behind the suspected impact of privatization on Austrian economic 
performance. For instance, reforms of the legal framework with respect to anti-
trust laws and competition policy and the abandonment of price regulations 
took place in Austria within the same period. In Austria, privatization came as 
a self-enforcing package with more prudent fiscal policies, liberalization and 
deregulation.
18 Hence, the following analysis of the macroeconomic growth 
and employment contribution of privatization and its impacts on profitability of 
firms in general has to be conducted accepting these caveats. Why should we 
not only focus on the employment and growth impact of privatization in 
Austria but also care about the effect of privatization on the development of 
capital markets? New share listings on the Vienna stock exchange can directly 
create some net new wealth and a limited number of additional high-skilled 
jobs, but the main economic benefit from more efficient and liquid capital 
markets arises from the financing opportunities and monitoring possibilities 
these markets deliver. Moreover, efficient capital markets foster economic 
growth and grant individual firms to fund investment opportunities they 
otherwise would have to forgo (see ,e.g., Belke, Fehn and Foster, 2003). 
Hence, privatization appears valuable in view of whatever direct role it has 
played in promoting the highly underdeveloped stock market development in 
Austria (through new share offerings), and for the indirect role it might have 
had also in Austrian bond market development (Megginson and Netter, 2001, 
p. 44).   -24-
We start with the discussion of the (un-) employment impacts of privatization 
in Austria, because this seems to be the politically most highlighted aspect of 
privatization in Austria. For OECD countries, among them Austria, current 
privatization receipts cannot be rejected empirically to have a significant 
negative effect on the current unemployment rate (implementation, new entry 
in the market), but a positive effect on the previous period‘s unemployment 
rate (announcement, restructuring). A potential explanation for this time 
pattern might be that when privatization and, thus, restructuring is announced 
firms feel inclined to operate more efficiently. If, as a next step, privatization is 
implemented, there is new market entry which increases labor demand and 
lowers unemployment (Katsoulakos and Likoyanni, 2002). Similar results can 
be found for instance in Megginson and Netter (2001) and some other studies 
for developing countries not to be cited here. However we would not like to 
push our interpretation of the Austrian case much further in view of the fact 
that the studies cited above do not give, for instance, fixed effects estimations 
of the idiosyncratic privatization impact in Austria. If the analysis is limited to 
the employment performance of Austrian firms after privatization, the general 
picture changes and one cannot reject the hypothesis of no change in 
employment after privatization. This is at least valid for Austria’s early 
privatizations of Austria Microsystems, Austrian Airlines, Böhler-Uddeholm, 
Energieversorgung Niederösterreich, Flughafen Wien Schwechat, Flender, 
Immotrust, OMV, Voestalpine Eisenbahntechnik, Voestalpine Technologie, 
Voestalpine Stahl and Voith which took place from 1987 to 1995   -25-
(Schaffhauser-Linzatti 2003). Moreover, in some cases production capacities 
were shifted towards foreign countries in the wake of privatization, in the case 
of Austria especially to Central and Eastern European countries (see e.g., the 
Semperit AG) which might overlap with the otherwise positive employment 
impact in Austria and create some empirical identification problems. 
However, evidence is more ambiguous with respect to the impacts of 
privatizations  on corporate performance in general. Some studies point 
towards the absence of a clear and unambiguous effect of changes in ownership 
on the economic performance of the affected firms and of the economy in 
general. Evidence that privatization enhances performance has not in all cases 
emerged from the Austrian data. For instance, Schaffhauser-Linzatti (2003) 
studies the change in operating and financial performance of Austrian firms 
Austria Microsystems, Austrian Airlines, Böhler-Uddeholm, 
Energieversorgung Niederösterreich, Flughafen Wien Schwechat, Flender, 
Immotrust, OMV, Voestalpine Eisenbahntechnik, Voestalpine Technologie, 
Voestalpine Stahl and Voith that were either partly or fully privatized during 
the period of 1987-1995. Using accounting data prior to and after the 
privatization, she measures the change in efficiency, profitability, capital 
structure, investment behavior, and employment (number of employees) for 
inflation- and business cycle-adjusted data. While profitability (i.e., the return 
on turnover, the return on equity and the return on total capital) and efficiency 
(alternatively measured as sales per employee, return per employee and staff 
costs per employee) display a significant change between the period of state   -26-
ownership and privatization the other measures exhibit no significant change. 
Hence, she concludes that the Austrian privatization program was not that 
successful as compared to other international experience. Reasons for these 
originally not expected results are the small sample included in this study, the 
partial instead of total privatization of most of the enterprises and the structure 
of the management. Here, the number and the persons of the board of directors 
nearly was kept constant, so there were only few possibilities to install new 
management techniques and a new leadership of the privatized Austrian firms. 
Moreover, after privatization there was on average a decrease in salaries of 
board members by 2.6 percent indicating either a lack of incentives after 
privatization or too high salaries before privatization.
19 
Gugler (1998) aims to add to the knowledge about the effects of privatization 
on the economic performance of former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
Austria. He assesses ownership structure (e.g., concentration) and the relative 
importance of the investor categories banks, the state, families, and domestic 
and foreign firms on the basis of a sample of 600 of the largest non-financial 
corporations. Balance sheet data, internal rates of return calculations and 
regression estimates show that not only ownership concentration, but also the 
identity of the large controlling shareholder is relevant to efficient governance 
of corporations. While foreign control increases profitability, particularly state 
control is detrimental to shareholder wealth maximization (see also Clemenz, 
1999, p. 21).   -27-
With respect to the capital market, it must not be forgotten that the “New 
Austrian” privatization policy significantly enhanced the role of the Vienna 
stock exchange itself.
20 This can be highlighted by two measures. First, during 
the period 1992 to 1997, around 45 percent of the total volume of new issues 
on the Vienna stock exchange consisted of issues by the OeIAG. Second, 
shares of privatized enterprises were responsible for 34.5 percent of the 
turnover on this stock exchange in the year 1997 (Nowotny, 1998, p. 43). 
Another important question is whether there has been a significant impact of 
privatization on the performance of the shares. In the years 1993 to 1997, the 
performance of shares of privatized enterprises was significantly better than the 
trend increase of the Vienna stock exchange as a whole (Nowotny, 1998, p. 
43). The relative importance of share issue privatizations (SIPs) in Austria can 
be read off from their relative position among Austrian firms in terms of the 
single firm’s market capitalization as a percentage of the entire national 
market’s year-end 1999. In Austria, privatized companies are the second most 
valuable firms (Megginson and Netter 2001, p. 43). Worldwide, large SIPs 
played a key role in the growth of capital markets almost everywhere, 
especially because they are generally among the largest firms in national 
markets. Davidson (1998) investigates 1,3,5, and 10-year market adjusted 
returns for these SIPs from five European countries (Austria, France, Italy, 
Spain, and the UK) through March 1997. After a long period of under-
performance, averaging 1-1.5% per year, he concludes that SIPs out-performed 
European market averages during the previous 12 months.    -28-
With all the caveats of missing benchmarks (e.g., the trend of the Vienna stock 
exchange or the ATX as a whole!!) and missing thirds factors (overlap with 
speculative bubbles?) in mind and just for illustration purposes, we now finally 
focus on two recent individual examples of Austrian privatization, namely the 
Vienna Airport and Telekom Austria. Can we observe an increasing 
profitability, i.e. an increased value of the shares after privatization at the 
Vienna stock exchange? This view is certainly not corroborated with respect to 
Vienna Airport, but it cannot be excluded for Austrian Telekom (see Figures 
4.1 and 4.2). Note: The date of complete privatization of Vienna Airport was 
March 2001. Its starting price at the Vienna stock exchange (closing) was 37.9 
Euros, its price in April 2001 rose to 39.1 Euros. In the last two thirds of the 
sample the trend development of the airport shares was significantly negative. 
However, a totally different picture emerged from trade in Telekom shares 
which started in Vienna and New York on November 21, 2000. At the 
beginning, the 75 percent shareholder OeAIG announced a share price of 123.8 
ATS respectively around 9 Euros. However, the price of Telekom shares 
(closing) fell immediately after the first privatization issue to a price of 6 euros 
in order to recover again and increase with a positive trend.  
- Figures 4.1 and 4.2 about here - 
Although the redemption of public debt itself is no sensible purpose of 
privatization
21, we finally address the fiscal effects/impacts of privatization on 
public budget deficits and on public debt. The reason is that exactly the   -29-
budgetary impacts seem to be an important incentive for Austria’s more recent 
strive for privatization. Katsoulakos and Likoyanni (2002) conduct an 
econometric analysis applying country level panel data of 23 OECD countries, 
among them Austria, for the period 1990 to 2000, analyzing the impact of 
privatization on public deficit, the impact on public debt. They are able to show 
that privatization receipts are not significantly correlated with budget deficit for 
the whole OECD sample, Austria being part of it. They also identify a 
statistically significant and negative relation between privatization receipts and 
public debt for the whole OECD sample which again includes Austria. 
However, any sound assessment of budget impacts of privatization in Austria 
should consider that especially in this country a higher number of sales is not at 
all correlated with higher proceeds (Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 2001, p 
21, see also section 4). 
4.   Some Extensions On Privatization in Austria 
4.1  Backlogs of Privatization and Their Elimination By the  
Recent Centre-right Coalition 
In the last sections we claimed significant backlogs of privatization in Austria, 
even if one takes into a account a potentially limited capacity of the Vienna 
stock exchange. One very intuitive example in this respect is the privatization 
of the two largest Austrian Banks which became a long-lasting and 
cumbersome process, if not a tragedy, from 1987 on. The latter was mainly due 
to political quarrels and arguments of the usual ‘too-big-to-fail’ kind and would   -30-
by itself justify a separate public choice analysis (Aiginger 1999, pp. 14 ff., 
Belke 2000a, EIRO 2002).
22 However, privatization gained momentum under 
Austria's centre-right coalition government which came into power in February 
2000, and was mainly intended to help to balance the budget (the so-called 
Austrian “Nulldefizit” target). We take this episode as evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that the democratic repercussions from the voter who fear tax 
increases if privatization would have been postponed any longer to the 
government functions in Austria today as well as in the past. Hence, one 
necessary condition for the emergence of politically motivated ‘privatization’ 
cycles, as we would like to call it, are still given especially in this country. 
Obviously, the new government including the FPÖ has initiated a 
comprehensive reform process, including extensive privatization. It claims that 
Austria has successfully privatized the majority of its large manufacturing 
firms and will continue privatization in order to consolidate the budget. 
Following the successful sales of the postal savings bank, Oesterreichische 
Postsparkasse AG (PSK) to the banking group BAWAG, and of stakes in 
Vienna airport, Vienna's famous auction house, the Dorotheum, and cigarette 
manufacturer Austria Tabak to Gallagher Group of the UK, and the 
privatization of all hospitals in Upper Austria in 2001, further privatization in 
2002 was hoped to be successful. The biggest Austrian privatization in history 
was the sale of Telekom Austria to Telecom Italia for €1.979 billion for a 25% 
minority holding. A fourth mobile license was recently sold to Germany’s 
Telekom Service GmbH & Co. KG for €98 million.    -31-
The correctness of our diagnosis of significant backlogs in the Austrian process 
of privatization is underlined by a recent study which confirms that the German 
civil law tradition negatively affects the probability of privatization. Bortolotti, 
Fantini and Siniscalco, 2001, p. 30ff., cannot reject empirically the hypothesis 
that countries like Austria seem particularly reluctant to privatize as opposed to 
common law countries. Moreover, Austria was not able to maintain its position 
in the top group in the current International Employment Ranking by the 
Bertelsmann Foundation. This gives some additional support to the main 
hypothesis of this contribution, namely that governments always time 
privatizations with an eye on their impacts on the performance of the labor 
market and thus on re-election probabilities. It states that the Austrian economy 
and the labor market are burdened in particular by high state intervention 
manifesting itself in abundant government outlays and a still high degree of 
regulation. However, the new government is endeavoring an extensive trim-
down of the state and the administration (Bertelsmann Foundation 2002). In the 
same vein, the Austrian reform commission (“Ausgabenreformkommission”) 
has tested the performance of the government institutions and has 
recommended that the state confines itself to certain central tasks. 
Finally, the importance of headquarters with high-value services, R&D with 
higher incomes in their surroundings is emphasized quite often (see, e.g., 
Aiginger in Austrian Parliament, 2000). According to his reasoning, Austria up 
to now has too few headquarters. With an eye on this deficiency, one of the 
objectives of the privatization of Voestalpine AG declared during the   -32-
extraordinary general meeting of the OeIAG on 7
th April 2003 has been that the 
decision-making headquarters of privatized former SOEs are maintained in 
Austria. Most strikingly and in strict accordance with the partisan view of 
privatization described later on, the decision-making headquarters of the 
company to be privatized shall be maintained in Austria if possible through the 
creation of Austrian core shareholders (OeIAG, 2003). 
4.2   The Political Economy of Austrian Privatization –  
The Roles of Ideology and Opportunism 
One further important stylized fact about Austria is that the role of this 
country’s financial market has remained marginalized up to now. Hence, the 
varieties of possibilities to sale public assets as a constitutional element of 
privatization are severely limited (EIRO 2002). It seems to be quite important 
to understand and, hence, to take into account already at this stage of analysis 
that the government’s choice of the privatization method itself and the resulting 
effects on income distribution reflect policy priorities (OECD 2002, p. 52, 
Bortolotti and Pinotti 2003). From this perspective and analogous to the well-
known ‘opportunistic’ and ‘partisan’ political business cycles, not only re-
election incentives as stressed in the sections 2 and 3, but also ideological 
purposes behind (a) non-privatization versus privatization or (b) choice of the 
privatization method come into play. For example, it should be taken into 
account that Austria has no substantial history of buying and selling shares on 
the stock market. Until the midst of the nineties, Austrian managers dealt   -33-
almost exclusively with banks (Aiginger 1999, Aiginger and Mooslechner 
1997, EIRO 1999). Banks in a bank-dominated financial system like in Austria 
have a vested interest in financing state-owned enterprises with soft budget 
constraints and, hence, are inclined to delay and obstruct privatization in order 
to preserve the status quo. However, this is only valid as long as the SOEs are 
relatively profitable. Hence, in the Austrian case growing non-profitability of 
the SOES could explain the recent impetus for privatization in spite of the 
existence of pressure groups like banks (Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 
2001, p. 3). 
However, especially in the UK and the French cases which were highlighted in 
section 3, the speed and the amount of privatization was significantly shaped 
by partisan politics and not only by the above mentioned pressure groups like, 
for instance, banks. Privatization in the UK was part of a whole “right-wing” 
Thatcherism package and French privatization was a decisive element of the 
now-famous Mitterand U-turn in economic policies towards a “right-wing” 
orientation. Hence, we feel inclined to suppose that also in Austrian 
privatization there was more in it than pure interest group pressure, 
opportunism of politicians with respect to the voters will or, even more naïve, a 
rational policy towards more efficiency of large Austrian enterprises. In this 
sense, some important questions not investigated in section 3.3 are the 
following: What were the ideological/partisan motives for privatization in the 
Austrian case? Was privatization guided by the incentive to gain revenues or to 
balance losses which would mean that financial motives of the seller were   -34-
dominant? What role do the aims of increasing productive efficiency, i.e. the 
reduction of average costs, and of enhancing allocation efficiency, i.e. the 
increase of the consumer surplus, play in the implicit politico-economic model 
of the privatization process in Austria which we already developed in section 
2?
 23 Has this model to be augmented by ideological/partisan aspects? 
In sections 2 and 3.3, we stated that political business cycle (PBC) 
considerations in general play an important role in explaining the existence and 
the slow speed of removal of oversupply of public services and that this is 
especially so in Austria with its former Austro-Keynesian type of stabilization 
policy. However, one should be careful in concluding that a slowdown in 
privatization efforts is necessarily in the interest of the government. The reason 
is that policy priorities like maximizing the value of proceeds from 
privatization might themselves be a function of re-election considerations 
(populist governments). This is especially valid from a partisan theory of 
political business cycles point of view. Privatization can be considered as a 
right-wing party issue as demonstrated by Austria’s younger history. However, 
the emergence of regular political business cycles, i.e. cyclical up- and 
downturns of macro variables, dependent on election dates, the political 
business cycle (PBC) à la Nordhaus (1975) and the Rogoff (1990) rational 
political business cycle (RPBC) is less likely. What has to be expected, instead, 
are different level of asset sales during privatization waves which are 
dependent on the ideology of the government (Aiginger, 1997, p. 351, Belke 
2000). We already stated that the Social Democrats and the trade unions   -35-
initially opposed to Austria’s EU entry which paved the way for more 
privatization. It seems to be very interesting for further research whether these 
considerations could lead, if developed further, to a revival of the 
opportunistic-ideological political business cycle à la Frey and Schneider in a 
different public economics context (Frey and Schneider, 1978). 
Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003) provide an empirical analysis of the role of 
political institutions in privatization. Their empirical testing relies on a new 
political database with continuous and time-varying measures of the political-
institutional setting, and of the partisan orientation of the executive. Using 
panel data for 21 industrialized countries in the 1977-1999 period, among them 
continental European countries like Austria, the authors show that the 
likelihood and the extent of privatization are positively associated with 
majoritarian political systems with a low number of veto players. In 
consensual proportional democracies like Austria, privatization tends to be 
delayed by “war of attrition” among different political actors. 
Strikingly, such a partisan determinant of the choice of the privatization 
method can be identified for countries like Austria with the following 
arguments. Right-wing executives with re-election concerns (as the recent 
“right-wing” coalition in Austria) design privatization to spread share 
ownership among domestic voters. Clear evidence of the relevance of this view 
for Austria is for instance given by the by now more concrete definition of the 
privatization mandate, the OEIAG has now been commissioned to examine   -36-
two privatization options for Voestalpine AG, namely through the stock market 
and through the acquisition of company stock by financial investors. One of the 
main objectives is that the company maintains an Austrian core shareholder 
structure (see Oesterreichische Industrieholding AG, 2003). Even in a more 
general context, it is said that the privatization project to be completed by 
OEIAG in accordance with the mandate from the federal government should 
lead to the maintenance of the decision-making headquarters of the company to 
be privatized in Austria if possible through the creation of Austrian core 
shareholder structures (OeIAG, 2003).
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By selling underpriced shares in the domestic retail market and not abroad
25, 
right-wing governments attract the median voter, shape a constituency 
interested in the maximization of the value of financial assets and averse to 
redistribution policies to the left. Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (2002) 
present models of how SIP terms can be structured to achieve certain policy 
objectives. Perotti (1995) demonstrates that a market-oriented (“right-wing”) 
government tends to underprice a relatively large portion of a SOE in the initial 
offer to convey a signal to investors that this government will not interfere with 
the privatized enterprise in the future. Since the value of a privatized firm is 
higher without interference, an efficient signal generally amplifies the degree 
of underpricing. On the other hand, a populist (“left-wing”) government, which 
ex definitione gives in to political pressure to interfere with the privatized firm, 
will definitely not underprice the SIP to the same degree. The reason is that the 
populist (“left-wing”) government prefers to raise more issue proceeds in the   -37-
short term, rather than signal a commitment it cannot keep and, hence, is not 
credible.
26 In fact, for Austria there is first evidence that the mean underpricing 
of initial public offerings of former SOEs is 6.5 percent for the period 1984 to 
1999 which was dominated by government participation of the ÖVP and a 
sample of 76 cases (Aussenegg, 1997). 
From this point of view, especially in Austria there is clear evidence of 
strategic privatization as a rational strategy to raise the probability of success of 
market-oriented coalitions at future elections.
27 With this emphasis on ideology 
and partisan aspects, we contradict Nowotny (1998), p. 46, who states: “In 
Austria, both economists and politicians have shown a greater tendency to 
follow a more general, non-ideological approach with respect to privatization 
issues”. 
Does this insight stand in contrast to some tendencies of parts of former 
Austrian SOEs to be sold to foreigners? We would argue no and give an 
example for this (Economist, 2003). The proposed flotation of one-third of 
Voestalpine in late September 2003 for an estimate €450m-plus ($494m) has 
induced many Austrians to accusations like that it is an unpatriotic sell-out to 
foreigners or that the market is being manipulated. Seemingly in contrast to our 
preferred partisan approach, Wolfgang Schüssel's right-wing coalition 
government has been shaken by these discussions.  
However, Voestalpine is not an ordinary company. Founded by the Nazis after 
the “Anschluss” (Union) with Germany in 1938 as the Hermann-Göring-Werke   -38-
in Linz, the steel mill became the flagship of Austria's state-owned industry 
and of trade unions and the Socialist Party. After a brush with bankruptcy, the 
partial privatization in the mid-1990s already mentioned in section 3 and 
diversification into car parts and rail systems, Voestalpine changed into one of 
Europe's most profitable steel groups and the pride of Linz and the surrounding 
province of Upper Austria.  
Hence, after secret talks with Magna International, a Canadian car-parts group, 
about a possible takeover and break-up of Voestalpine, the finance minister Mr 
Grasser had to promise that Voestalpine would not be taken over by foreigners 
and would definitely not be split up. He suggested a private sale to selected 
investors, but the European Commission in Brussels finally denied it. So 
Grasser and Schuessel instead proposed a public share offer—with a clear 
corporatist flavor. Instead of organizing road shows to solicit the highest bids 
from international fund managers, the state holding group OEIAG gave a few 
weeks' notice and began to assemble investors who are already owners of 
around 30% of Voestalpine. Their leader is Ludwig Scharinger, a big banker 
close the People's Party. Assured of his support, Mr Schuessel declared that 
Voestalpine would stay in the control not only of Austrians but of Upper 
Austrians. In the same vein, he accepts a much lower price for Voestalpine to 
keep it in familiar hands (corresponding to our hypothesis of underpricing). 
Freedom Party people still fight against foreign takeovers and request that 
further privatization should be stopped. The Economist (2003) accurately 
describes the current Austrian situation emphasizing again the importance of   -39-
voter repercussions in the Austrian context: “ … But the rumpus may have 
scared foreign investors away. That, it seems, is what Austrian voters want”. 
With an eye on ideological/partisan impacts described above, which 
institutional framework is necessary for successful privatization in Austria? 
Here, one could derive some lessons from the Austrian experience with respect 
to the institutional framework needed for a successful privatization, stressing 
for instance the eventual role of a more professional privatization agent than 
the OeIAG is in monitoring the privatization process (Aiginger 1999). In Table 
3.2, the data for Austria refer only to privatizations by the central government 
(OECD 2002, pp. 46 f.). The general Austrian approach to privatization by the 
state (as opposed to privatization by state-owned banks) has generally been to 
downsize in terms of employment only very moderately by general social or 
pension plans. However, privatization enacted by state-owned banks like in the 
cases of the tyre maker Semperit AG (which a few years ago left Austria and 
now produces in the Czech Republic) and of Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG (shares 
of which were bought by the mogul Frank Stronach and which after 
privatization displayed a good performance due to, e.g., technical innovations) 
led to significant labor shedding (EIRO 1999). Hence, the choice of the 
privatization agent seems to matter for employment impacts of privatization 
and thus for the probability of re-election cycles. In this sense, “leftist” as 
opposed to “rightist” governments which tend to refrain from significant labor 
shedding should prefer privatization by the state. Is this partisan determinant of 
the choice of the privatization method significant and consistent throughout?   -40-
The answer is no, since in order to get re-elected (and then follow ideological 
partisan interests) even right-wing governments can be expected to be 
opportunistic in a sense by always having an eye on a sufficient employment 
performance (Frey and Schneider, 1978). According to section 4.1, this seems 
to correspond with Austrian history and the choice of the OeIAG as the 
privatization agency. If these kind of considerations would not have played a 
decisive role in Austrian privatization policy, a bottom-up system with 
pouvoirs for the OEIAG had to be installed instead of the actual top-down 
model, in which the government sets the guidelines.
28 
4.3   Why Are Some Sectors in Austria Privatized and Others Not? 
We now comment on why specific sectors were privatized and others were not. 
To which extent can this selection be explained by public choice 
considerations? Two examples are instructive in this respect. First, the 
autonomy and the financial basis of Austrian universities were strengthened in 
view of the problems in the education sector. Student fees that flow directly to 
the universities have been introduced. Why have the relevant pressure groups 
been able to prevent the long-awaited ‘privatization’ of this important sector 
until the start of the new century? Second, like in many other industrial nations, 
also in Austria the labor market suffers from a severe qualification mismatch. 
Hence, policy makers took some measures to promote a more efficient use of 
labor force potentials. Most remarkable, the Austrian government authorized 
the operation of the first private job placement services already in 1992 and   -41-
expanded it to all sectors of the labor market only two years later. Private 
agencies in this field work under the same conditions as the Austrian labor 
market service (“Arbeitsmarktservice” or AMS). However, the share of private 
services in the overall number of providers is still extremely low. Is this due to 
the well-known and still highly relevant insider-outsider problem on the labor 
market? Or more generally speaking: How strong has the relative influence of 
external shareholders and employee representatives been over company 
restructuring in Austria? Most remarkably in this respect, recent evidence 
seems to demonstrate that privatization has had no impact on industrial 
relations in Austria (EIRO 1999, 2002). In the past, trade-unions had an 
influential position within the OeAIG and in the single companies as well via 
their membership in the advisory boards (Nowotny, 1998, p. 43). Only 
recently, on September 5 2003, 300 steel workers gave voice to their anger 
against the privatization of the last 35 percent of the once fully state owned 
steel works Voestalpine in Linz, Upper Austria, when the state holding 
company OEIAG was meeting to finalize the privatization deal. In the same 
vein, Austrian interests must in accordance with the mandate of the OeIAG 
from the federal government be protected in the course of privatization by the 
creation and maintenance of secure jobs in Austria (OeIAG, 2003). 
However, one could argue that the increasing ownership by foreigners will 
weaken the traditional system of “social partnership” considerably in the 
future. Within this informal but powerful body of employers’ and employee’s 
associations, each member group of social partners which in each case is close   -42-
to one of the two large political parties followed significant special interests. 
Since each party favored privatization in the domain of the other (Social 
Democrats for instance in the area of agriculture or of entrepreneurship, 
Conservatives in the area of the nationalized industry). This party-“ideological” 
view significantly almost certainly contributes to an explanation of the only 
recently resolved deadlock of privatization efforts in Austria. Already in the 
year 1999 it became obvious that several larger firms including Austrian 
owned ones have begun to cut back their contributions to employers’ 
associations (Clemenz, 1999, p. 22). Seen on the whole, the role of social 
partners for instance in cartel courts hampers workable competition and has to 
be reduced in order to reap the full gains of privatization. 
4.4  Changes in the Institutional Environment of the Austrian Economy 
and the Speed of Privatization 
Our last remarks relate to certain changes in the institutional environment for 
the Austrian economy which might have had an important impact on the speed 
of privatization in this country. One obvious candidate for such a change is 
Austria’s EU entry (1995). (Why) Can it serve as an important structural break 
with respect to privatization efforts? One potential answer would be to point to 
the fact that the Austrian system of subsidies has had to be abandoned or 
modified as a necessary condition of entry. However, the key point here is that 
the process of privatization and the accompanying liberalization and 
deregulation have become irreversible and immune against the objections of   -43-
major lobbies in Austrian politics and economics (Clemenz, 1999, p. 22). 
Where does this lock-in effect come from? First, as shown in section 3.4, in 
some areas like in the Austrian telecommunication sector consumers have 
profited very much as compared to the time of state monopoly. Hence, there is 
no obvious reason for the median voter to argue in favor of re-establishing a 
state monopoly. Second, international commitments like Austria’s membership 
in the EU and treaties connected with it are not easy to reverse.
29 Third, many 
foreign firms have entered the Austrian market in the wake of Austria’s EU 
entry which by itself have changed the ownership structure considerably. There 
is no way out for Austrian firms from competing with these FDIs. 
Another important politico-economic aspect stressing the benefits of Austria’s 
EU entry is that EU-membership was an opportunity to implement overdue 
reforms. Due to the inevitability and comprehensiveness of the reform steps 
connected with EU entry and due to the fact that the EU became a suitable 
“whipping boy” for reforms against the interests of some party clientel, time-
consuming struggles about these steps became obsolete. Moreover, potential 
external effects of privatization in only one sector become internalized now, 
resolving the deadlock between the interest groups described above (Clemenz, 
1999, p. 19). 
It is again important to note a “partisan” (ideological) component in this 
respect. The Austrian ministry of foreign affairs, for most of the post war 
period a permanent job of the Social Democrats, was taken over by the smaller   -44-
partner of the big coalition, the Conservatives, in the year 1987. This change in 
ideology of the foreign minister finally paved the way for determined efforts of 
Austria to join the European Community and meet the European policy 
standards after the fall of the iron curtain (by which the Soviet Union which 
regularly exercised its right to veto against Austria’s EU entry disappeared 
from the scene) and, finally, also for meeting the Maastricht criteria as an 
important prerequisite to join European Monetary Union. Apart from the 
increasing dissatisfaction with the poor performance of the SOEs (especially 
the Austrian telecommunication monopolist) at that time, partisanship was thus 
again decisive for enabling a structural break in privatization incentives as 
already discussed earlier in this contribution. 
However, there is a second natural candidate of a change in Austria’s 
institutional environment triggering privatization, namely the Austrian 
exchange rate regime. To what extent can the intensity of privatization be 
traced back to the specific exchange rate regime as an important external 
constraint? In the preceding sections, we only touched upon this very 
interesting issue. Our guess would be that the increase of privatization might 
also be a facet of Austria’s convergence to the euro zone countries, since 
similar degrees of privatization might imply inter alia a higher correlation of 
country-specific business cycles. Hence, one possible interpretation would be 
that an accelerating speed of privatization in Austria represents one cornerstone 
on Austria’s way to form an optimum currency area with the euro zone (see, 
e.g., Hochreiter and Winckler, 1995). However, one might even go further and   -45-
suspect that also Austria’s strong intentions to become a first-wave member of 
European Monetary Union had an amplifying impact on its privatization 
efforts. Due to its close ties to the DM, the financial markets expected Austria 
to be in almost for sure. Hence, Austria had to prepare itself for the 
increasingly fierce competition within a single currency area by fostering 
privatization of inefficient SOEs (Jeronimo, Pagan and Soydemir, 2000). 
A third candidate for a break in incentives with respect to privatization is one 
of the conditions for EMU entry, namely the Maastricht debt criterion. 
Already Germany and France in 1998 are said to have sold their “family silver” 
in order to push their debt below the 60 percent of GDP threshold. However, 
there is a coincidence with the accumulation of privatization efforts towards 
the end of the nineties. Hence, it appears logical to also ask how much of 
Austria’s privatization efforts in the nineties was enacted in order to fulfill the 
Maastricht debt criterion and later on to obey the stability pact, or at least was 
sold to the public as such.
30 In this sense, governments would be tempted to use 
privatization receipts in order to reduce their public debt in order to meet one 
convergence criterion. 
We already pointed out in section 3 that in France privatization activities were 
highest in 1998, the year before the launch of the euro, due to a privatization of 
France Telecom. Based on similar motives, the current Austrian government 
has generally pursued a (in economic terms) liberal and market-oriented 
economic policy, which has focused on privatization and a reduction of state   -46-
influence on business. In line with this, the electricity sector was opened to 
competition in September 2001 leading to lower prices for customers and more 
competitiveness of Austria’s electricity industry. In addition, bureaucratic 
procedures in doing business in Austria have been simplified. One of the 
government's main concern, however, has been to achieve a balanced budget in 
order to satisfy the EU's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
31 In 1999, Austria's 
budget deficit exceeded the EU-set Maastricht criteria of a maximum budget 
deficit of 3 percent, which had drawn severe criticism from the EU (The irony 
of history being that at the end of the year 2003 Austria is legitimized to accuse 
the large euro area countries of disregarding the rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact). While aiming to reach a zero budget in 2002, the Austrian 
finance minister Grasser was able to announce achievement of this goal in 
November 2001. In our understanding, this had on the one hand been due to an 
unexpectedly sharp increase in Austrian tax revenue in 2001, as revenues from 
corporation tax and income tax rose significantly and debt servicing costs 
decreased. In addition, the states and municipalities assisted in balancing the 
federal budget as they accrued budget surpluses. On the other hand, however, 
the need to lower the budget deficit served as a strong (but only indirect) 
stimulus for privatization efforts in order to raise additional revenues by 
increased efficiency of the Austrian economy.
32  
At this stage of analysis, it is important to note that privatization proceeds are 
only allowed to have an impact on the public debt but not on the public deficit. 
Privatization proceeds must not be included in the public deficit in Maastricht   -47-
definition according to the EC directive 3605/93 of the Council from 
November 22, 1993. This is a point often neglected by authors writing on 
Austrian privatization and the fiscal Maastricht criteria and also not always 
clear in Austrian political circles (see, e.g., Nationalrat der Republik 
Österreich, 1996, p. 19). Seen on the whole, thus, the Austrian case is a good 
example of how external constraints can discipline a “consensus oriented” 
country. It seems fair to state that without EU-membership and the strive for 
meeting the Maastricht criteria, the evidence in favor of “New Austrian Public 
Policies” and increasing privatization activity would have been much weaker 
than it already is. 
Although beneficial for themselves, the main aim of privatizations should not 
as a rule primarily be to finance and lower public debt for political purposes. 
Otherwise privatization would tend to serve short-run objectives instead of 
promoting long-run goals, such as fostering productivity. In this case, the 
standard purpose of privatizations, the improvement of competitiveness and 
profitability of former SOEs is under-emphasized at the benefit of the aim of 
repaying outstanding of debt which, however, is not necessarily welfare 
enhancing. However, the latter was given a high priority in recent Austrian 
laws and directives (Austrian Parliament 2000). Instead, the revenues from 
privatization should only be used for the creation of new assets in the areas of 
education, R&D, technology and infrastructure (Katsoulakos and Likoyanni 
2002, p. 13, Schneider 2002).   -48-
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Privatization has certainly been a key-element of structural reform in the 
European Union countries including Austria and proceeds from privatization 
have been substantial in most of these countries. Gross receipts that can be 
transferred to the budget are effected by actions prior to sale, the sales process 
and the post-privatization regime. An evaluation of the potential uses of 
privatization receipts or proceeds should reflect the implications for 
government net worth and their macroeconomic impact. In so far as 
government net worth is concerned, proceeds from privatization do not often 
themselves indicate that the government is better off. Privatization has longer 
term implications in terms of revenues forgone and/or expenditures that will 
not be made in the future and government decisions on the use of proceeds 
should reflect this inter-temporal effects. Government net worth will rise to the 
extent that private sector ownership leads to an increase in efficiency and the 
government shares in this gain.  
The macroeconomic effects of privatization depend, in part, on whether 
receipts/proceeds are from domestic or foreign sources, the degree of capital 
mobility and the exchange regime. Broadly the effects of a decrease in the 
deficit financed by privatization receipts would be similar to those resulting 
from a debt financed fiscal expansion. Both the economic recovery and 
privatizations lead to receipts which can be used to lower the deficit. The use 
of proceeds to reduce external debt provides for an automatic sterilization of   -49-
what may be substantial capital inflows associated with privatization. The 
reduction of domestic debt may impact domestic stability. 
This contribution has shown that there are good reasons for privatization in 
general although this strategy raises some opportunity costs and that the 
privatization proceeds are able under certain circumstances to enhance the 
welfare of these countries. With regard to Austria we are skeptical about 
whether Austria’s privatization potential has been exploited up to now and 
whether the speed of privatization, although quite sizeable, has really been 
sufficient. However, future prospects for quick and full privatization in Austria 
are rather gloomy although economic theory (Alchian and others) and also 
empirical evidence suggest that only full as opposed to partial privatization is 
successful with respect to a better economic performance in the long run 
(Boardman and Vining, 1989, 1991). However, as long as politicians interfere 
with this process, there will be no straight development towards full 
privatization. This assessment is all the more valid with an eye on the Austrian 
habit to appoint former members of the Austrian government as CEOs at the 
Austrian privatization agency OEIAG and the state is still determined to keep a 
strategic stake in the latter. According to the statute of the Österreichische 
Industrieholding AG, “ … Austrian interests must be protected as follows: … 
the creation and maintenance of secure jobs in Austria, … maintenance of the 
decision-making headquarters of the company to be privatized in Austria…” 
(Österreichische Industrieholding AG, 2003). However, one glimmer of hope 
currently is that Austrian Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grasser does not stop to   -50-
reiterate in December 2003 that the state will sell all of its remaining stake in 
Telekom Austria, despite some calls to keep a blocking minority. The state 
privatization agency OeIAG, charged by the government with selling off most 
of Austria's industrial holdings, holds 47 percent of Telekom and is now 
charged by the centre-right government with selling it by late 2006. This seems 
to be extremely important since otherwise a continued holding would only 
slow down Telekom Austria in adapting to a fast moving telecoms market. 
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Table 3.1: Worldwide Privatizations between 1980 and 1996 
 








1) Transformation  countries  51.500  274.700  1990-96 
OECD (1996)
 1) Transformation  countries  44.600  253.200  1990-96 
THA (1994)  East Germany  13.800  35.000  1990-94 
Kikeri, Nellis, Shirley (1994)  World  4.000  -  1980-92 
Sader (1993)  World  1.800  -  1980-92 
In sum  World  > 65.000  > 300.000  1980-96 
 
1) Without East Germany and China. 
 




Table 3.2: Privatization of State-owned Enterprises: Global Amount Raised from Privatization, 1990-2000 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7  8  9  10 
1990/91 1992/93 1994/95 1996/97 1998/99  2000  Total  1990-
















Million USD  Billion 
USD 
Total 1990-








Austria  80 191  1,735  3,954  2,564  2,083  10,607  266.3 3.9  6.2 
Belgium  n.a. 956  3,297  3,039  2,277  n.a.  9,569 316.1 3.0  8.8 
Denmark  644 122 239 411  4,521  111  6,048  205.6  2.9  13.5 
Finland  n.a. 229  1,529  1,746  5,713  1,827 11,044 165.8 6.6  n.a. 
France  n.a. 12,160  9,615  13,288  22,460  17,438  74,961 1,755.6  4.2  14.5 
Germany  325 435 240  14,353  7,098  n.a.  29,549  2,680.0 1.1  11.6 
Greece  n.a. 35 117  1,953  8,772  1,384  12,261  138.1 8.8  17.9 
Ireland  515  344  157  293  4,846  1,458 7,613 104.8 7.2  n.a. 
Italy  n.a. 1,943  13,927  33,984  39,230  9,728  98,812 1,204.9 8.2  12.5 
Luxembourg  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.  24.7  n.a.  n.a. 
Netherlands  895 780  7,759  2,070  1,816  310  13,630 494.6  2.7  8.1 
Portugal  2,390 2,826 3,557 7,932 5,884 3,256  25,845  128.0  20.2  16.6 
Spain  172  4,043  4,399 15,201  12,582 1,079  37,476  702.4  5.3  10.7 
Sweden  n.a. 630  3,165  1,840  2,243  8,082 15,960 276.8 5.7  16.0 
UK  34,731 9,127  8,032 12,154  n.a.  n.a.  64,044  1,294.4  4.9  11.0 
EU 15  39,752  33,821  57,768 112,218  120,006 46,756  410,321  9,758.1  4.2  n.a. 
Norway  73 n.a.  639  695  454  1,039 2,900 170.5 1.7  22.7 
Switzerland  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  4,426  n.a.  4,426 337.0 1.3  n.a. 




Table 3.2. Continued: Privatization of State-owned Enterprises: Global Amount Raised from Privatization, 1990-2000 
 
1 2 3 4  5  6  7 8  9 10 
1990/91 1992/93 1994/95 1996/97  1998/99  2000  Total  1990-




Million USD  Million 
USD 










in % of 
2000 GDP 
c) 
Invest. of SOE 





n.a. n.a.  2,282  1,436  1,176  544  5,438  54.0  10.0  n.a. 
Hungary  508  2,562 4,830 3,123 441 66 11,530 54.4 21.2  n.a. 
Poland  194 806  1,826  3,485  5,501  5,993  17,805  163.3  10.9  n.a. 
Slovakia  n.a. 63  1,419  497  n.a.  n.a.  1,979  22.5  8.8  n.a. 
Australia  1,061 3,950  10,144  36,011  22,366  6,239  79,771  465.2 1.3  16.4 
Canada  2,312 2,004 4,488 1,768 11 n.a.  10,583  694.4 1.5  n.a. 
Japan  n.a. 15,919  13,773  10,388  21,497  n.a.  61,577  5,639.5  1.1  8.2 
New 
Zealand 
3,912 1,597  293  1,839  1,772  n.a. 9,413  67.6 13.9  n.a. 
United 
States 
n.a. n.a. n.a.  3,650  3,100  n.a.  6,750  9,076.6  0.07  3.7 
Total 
OECD-30 
62,423 107,332  133,873  249,562  275,804  65,063  0,2  27,708.6 0.2  n.a. 
 
Sources:  OECD (2001), Financial Market Trends, here: no 79, June; OECD (2001), Main Economic Indicators, December, World Bank (1996) and 
CESifo calculations. 
 
See also for privatization through public share offerings: CESifo (2003), DICE database Tables “Privatization of State-owned Enterprises Through Public 
Share Offerings 1961-2000: Issue Size per Country” and “Privatization of State-owned Enterprises Through Public Share Offerings, 1961-2000: Number 
and Names of Enterprises”.  
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Table 3.3: Privatization of State-owned Enterprises Through Public Share Offerings, 1961-2000: Issue Size per Country (Million USD) 
 
  1961-89 1990-91 1992-93  1994-95  1996-97 1998-99 2000 
a)  Tot. 1961-2000 Tot. 1990-99 
(only PSO) 
OECD 
b) 1990-99  
(all priv.) 
Austria  662 n.a. 211 1,086 733 n.a.  n.a.  2,692  2,030  8,524 
Belgium  n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,571  1,100  n.a.  n.a.  3,671  3,671  9,569 
Denmark  n.a. n.a. n.a. 3,006 n.a. n.a.  n.a.  3,006  3,006  5,937 
Finland  367 n.a. 214  800  285  5,573  1,900 9,139  6,872  9,217 
France  15,478 780  9,695 19,263 12,261  24,982  1,770  84,229  66,981  57,523 
Germany  4,536 n.a.  n.a.  730 13,300  10,624  17,460 46,650  24,654  22,415 
Greece  n.a. n.a.  33  n.a. 2,365  2,794  n.a.  5,192  5,192  10,877 
Ireland  n.a. 136 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  4,300  n.a.  4,436  4,436  6,155 
Italy  1,157 695 2,481 10,220  34,462  36,190  n.a.  85,205  84,048  89,084 
Luxembourg  n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Netherlands  2,278  n.a. n.a.  11,632  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  13,910  11,632  13,320 
Portugal  434  1,829 2,375  2,255  6,428 5,998 n.a.  19,319  18,885  22,589 
Spain  2,326 n.a. 3,193 3,950  13,432  21,652  n.a.  44,553  42,227  36,379 
Sweden  165 n.a. 364 3,765 n.a. n.a.  8,800 13,094  4,129  7,878 
UK  51,766 27,908  7,360  6,200  5,649  n.a.  n.a.  98,883  47,117  64,044 
EU 15  79,169 31,348 25,926  65,478  90,015  112,113  29,930  433,979  324,880  363,511 
Switzerland  n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5,600  n.a.  5,600  5,600  4,426 
Japan  82,402 n.a.  7,312  3,400  6,440  46,500  n.a.  146,054  63,652  61,577 
USA  1,650 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 1,425  n.a.  1,425  1,425  6,750 
Note: PSO = Public Share Offering. 
(a) Till August 2000. (b) Total Amount raised from Privatization; these figures are supposed to be bigger than those of the amount raised only from 
privatization through PSO. This is the case for most countries, but not for all. 
Compare with CESifo (2003), here: Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises: Global Amount Raised from Privatization. 
 
Sources: Megginson (2000), B. Bortolotti et al. (2000), OECD (2000),  here: no. 76, 07-2000, and CESifo (2003).  
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Table 3.4.: Privatization of State-owned Enterprises Through Public Share Offerings, 1961-2000: Number and Names of 
Enterprises 
  No. of enterprises 
priv. 
Names of enterprises privatized 
Austria  10  Austria Mikro Systeme, Austria Tabak, Austrian Airlines, Böhler Uddeholm, Flughafen Wien, ÖMV 
Aktiengesellschaft (Mineralöl), VA Technologie (as a separation from VOEST), Verbund Energie-Versorgung 
Niederösterreich (EVN), Voest- Alpine Eisenbahnsysteme, Vorarlberger Kraftwerke (VKW). 
Belgium  2  Belgacomm, Credit Communal de Belgique. 
Denmark  2  Copenhagen Airport, Tele Danmark AS. 
Finland  8  Finnair, Fortum, Kemira, Outokumpu, PT Finland Group, Sonera, Rautaruukki, Valmet. 
France  34  Aerospatiale, Agence Havas, Air France, Alcatel Alsthom, Assurances Generales de France [AGF], Banque 
Nationale de Paris, Banque de Batement et des Traveaux Publics, Banque Industrielle & Mobiliere Privee 
(BIMP), Banque Paribas, Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance, Compagnie Financiere de Suez, Compagnie Generale 
D’Electricite, Credit Commercial de France, Credit Local de France, Credit Lyonnais, Elf Acquitaine, France 
Telecom, Machines Bull, Matra, Pechiney, Renault, Rhone- Poulenc, Saint Gobain, Seita, SGS-Thomson, 
Societe Generale, Sogenal Mar, STMicroelectronics, Television Francaise, Thomson- CSF, Total S.A., Union 
Des Assurances De Paris, Usinor Sacilor, Wanadoo. 
Germany  10  Deutsche Siedlungs- und Landesrentenbank (DSL), Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Verkehrs- Kredit- Bank, 
Industrie Verwaltungsgesellschaft (IVG), Jenoptik, Lufthansa, T-Online, VEBA AG, VIAG, Volkswagen AG. 
Greece  6  Athens Stock Exchange, General Helenic Bank, Hellenic Petroleum, Hellenic Sugar Industries, National Bank of 
Greece, OTE: 
Ireland  2  Greencore (formerly Irish Sugar Corporation), Telecom Eireann. 
Italy  20  AEM, Aeroporti die Roma, Alitalia May, Autostrade, Banca Commerciale Italiana, Banca di Roma, 
Banca Nazionale de Lavoro, Bando di Napoli, Credito Italiano, Enel, Eni, Enimont, Instituto 
Mobiliare Italiano, Istituto Bancario San Paolo, Istituto Nazionale D.Assicurazioini, Istituto San Paolo 
di Torino, Saipen, Societa Finanziaria, Telecom Italia, Telefonica (STET). 
Luxembourg -  
Netherlands  5  KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Koninklije PTT Nederland, KPN, Naamloze Venootschap DSM, NMP 
Postbank. 
Norway  1  Christiana Bank.  
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Table 3.4.  Cont. Privatization of State-owned Enterprises Through Public Share Offerings, 1961-2000:No. and Names of Enterpr. 
 
  No. of enterpr. priv.  Names of enterprises privatized 
Portugal  22  Banco Espirito Santo e Comercial de Lisboal, Banco Fomento Exterior, Banco Fonsecas & Burney, Banco 
Pinto & Sotto Mayor, Banco Portugues do Atlantico, Banco Totta & Acores, Brisa- Auto Estradas, Centralcer, 
CIMPOR, Companhia de Seguros Bonanca, Companhia Maceira Pataias, Crédito Predial Portugues, 
Electricidade de Portugal, Imperio, Mundial Confianca, Petrogal, Portugal Telecom, SECIL, Sociedad 
Financeira Portuguesa, Tranquilidade, Uniao de Bancos Portugues, Unicer. 
Spain  11  Aceralia, Argentaria Corp., Endesa May, Gas Natural, Gas y Electricidad de Espana (GESA), Indra, Red 
Electrica Espanola, Repsol May, Retevision, Tabaclera, Telefonica. 
Sweden  6  Assi Domän, Pharmacia, Procordia, Stadshypotek, Svenskt Stal AB (SSAd), Telia. 
UK  44  AEA Technology, Amersham International, Anglian Water plc., Associated British Ports, BAA plc (British 
Airpots Authority), British Aerospace, British Airways, British Energy, British Gas, British Petroleum, British 
Steel, British Telecommunications, Britoil, Cable and Wireless, East Midlands Electricity plc., Eastern 
Electricity plc., Enterprise Oil, Jaguar plc., London Electricity plc., Manweb plc., Midlands Electricity plc., 
National Power, North West Water Group plc., Northern Electric plc., Northumbian Water Group plc., 
Norweb plc., Power Gen, Railtrack May, Rolls Royce, Scottish Hydro- Electric, Scottish Power, SEEBOARD 
plc., Severn Trent plc., South Wales Electricity plc., South West Water plc., South Western Electricity plc., 
Southern Water plc., Southern Electric plc., Thames Water plc., Welsh Water plc., Wessex Water plc., 
Yorkshire Electricity Group plc., Yorkshire Water. 
Switzerland 1 Swisscom. 
Japan  7  Japan Airlines, Japan Railroad East, Japan Tobacco, JR West, KDD, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, NTT 
DoCoMo. 
USA  3  AT&T, Consolidated Rail Corp., United States enrichment Corp. 
Sources: W.L.Megginson, 2000), Bortolotti et al. (2000), and CESifo calculations. See also tables “Privatization of State-owned Enterprises 
Through Public Share Offerings, 1961-2000: Dates and Amount”, “Privatization of State-owned Enterprises: Global Amount Raised from 
Privatization, 1990-1999”.  
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Table 3.5.: Privatization proceeds in small open economies in the years 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998 and 2000 
 
Privatization proceeds in small open economies 




























Austria  142  4%  7  1.035  9%  4  2.020  17%  2  2.935  12%  5  2.083  11%  3 
Belgium  956 29% 1 2.681  22% 2 1.562  13% 3 1.467  6%  7  -  -  - 
Denmark  122 4% 8  10  0% 9  45 0,5%  8 4.502  18% 2  111 1% 8 
Finland  229 7% 6 363 3% 7 835 7% 5  1.999  8% 6  1.827  10%  4 
Ireland  274 8% 4 157 1% 8 293 3% 7  4.864  19%  1  1.458  8% 5 
Island  10  0%  9 6  0%  10  4  0%  10  129  0,5%  10 -  - - 
Netherlands  780  24%  2  3.993  33%  1 831  7% 6 335  0,5%  9 310  2% 7 
Norway -  -  -  521  4%  6  35  0,5%  9  28  0%  11  1.039  6%  6 
Portugal  500 15% 3 2.425  20% 3 4.968  43% 1 4.271  17% 4 3.256  18% 2 
Sweden  252 8% 5 852 7% 5  1.055  9% 4 172 1% 8  8.082  44%  1 
Switzerland  - -  - - -  - - -  -  4.426  18%  3  - -  - 
Total  3,265  100%  12,043  100%  11,648  100%  25,128  100%  18,166  100%  
 
 
-  =  Null or insignificant  
Source: Own calculations with the help of table 3.2.  
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Table 3.6:  Latest Privatization proceeds in Austria (Federal government) over 1999-2001 
 
Year Public  Enterprise 
 









100%   PSK (Postal Bank)  969.5 Mio. Euro
  24.4%    Telecom (to Telecom Italia)  763.8 Mio. Euro
  100%    State Printing Office  2.2 Mio. Euro





17.38%  Airport Vienna AG  54.1 Mio. Euro
  41.1%   Austrian Tabacco AG  582.2 Mio. Euro
  100%   Dorotheum  55.6 Mio. Euro
  100%   Strohal Rotary Printing  21.1 Mio. Euro
   713.0 Mio. Euro
  
Sum   1999-2001  2,455.3 Mio. Euro
 
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs (2002).  
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Figure 3.1.:Privatization Proceeds in percent of GNP in small open economies in the years 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000 
 



















































































































































Figure 4.1: Performance of shares of Vienna Airport 
        at the Vienna Stock Exchange  
  
Source: Vienna Stock Exchange (2003). VOL means trade volume. 
 
Figure 4.2: Performance of shares of Telekom Austria 
        at the Vienna Stock Exchange  
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discussion is given in Borcherding, Pommerehne and Schneider (1982). 
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7 The Austrian type of Keynesian policy used the public enterprises and state owned firms for 
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(2002) and Schneider and Bartel (1992). 
8 See, for instance, Aiginger in Austrian Parliament (2000). 
9 Compare also Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2001) and Schneider (2003). 
10 See among others Aiginger (1999). Nowotny (1998), pp. 39 ff., discusses different meanings 
of ‚privatization’ more deeply in the context of Austria. 
11 See Clemenz (1999) and Nowotny (1998), pp. 37 ff., on Austrian public enterprises as 
instruments of economic and social policy as a means of avoiding labor market hysteresis 
(Theory of Co-operative Economics or “Gemeinwirtschaft”). 
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Clemenz (1999), pp. 5ff. 
13 Carlin et al. (2001), pp. 2ff. document for the case of Austria that between-sector movements 
accounted for 6.5% of the total between 1991 and 1996, i.e. 1.1 percentage points out of a total 
increase of 17.4 percentage points. In this sense, Austria is entirely typical of market 
economies. 
14 This was especially the case in Austria.  
15 However, employment losses often appear to be widely exaggerated. For instance, the 
Communist Party of Austria (2003) argues that the number of employed in the Austrian 
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16 Own calculations based on an econometrically estimated simulation model. 
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20 See Nowotny (1998), p. 43. Nevertheless, the role of the Vienna stock exchange was still 
limited until Eastern enlargement of the EU.  
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21 See Clemenz in Austrian Parliament (2000). 
22 Astonishingly and perhaps due to the specific Austrian phenomenon of politically motivated 
decision making even in business affairs, neither the unions nor the works council of the Bank 
Austria opposed to the takeover of the Bank Austria by the Bavarian HypoVereinsbank. See 
EIRO (2002). 
23 See, for instance, Aiginger (1999). 
24 See OeIAG (2003). This should be done by means of syndicates with industrial partners, 
banks, insurance companies, pension funds, severance pay funds, investment funds, etc.     
(1998), p. 43, explicitly mentions the Austrian efforts to achieve a domestic owner ship 
component by means of granting of preferences to employees and of an Austrian bonus in the 
case of shares hold for a longer time. In 1998, it was estimated that around 50 percent of the 
shares were still in private Austrian ownership. 
25 This view is also totally consistent with the remarkable change of positions of the Freedom 
party, which became determined anti-European, after being the sole supporter of Austrian EC-
membership for a long time, see Clemenz, 1999, p. 17. 
26 Biais and Perotti (2002) show that privatizing governments that cannot commit to absentism 
are still able to reduce investors’ perceived probability of future interference by allocating 
underpriced shares to median class voters. Hence, the number of shares of the SOE initially 
sold and the associated underpricing will increase with the degree of income inequality of the 
privatizing country. 
27 However, also left-wing governments embark on privatization but mostly when fiscal 
conditions deteriorate (see, e.g., Italy). See Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003) and Jones et al. 
(1999). Aussenegg (2000) compares the characteristics and the price behavior of case-by-case 
privatization initial public offerings and private sector initial public offerings in Poland over 
the first nine years after the reopening of the Warsaw Stock Exchange in April 1991. He finds 
evidence that the Polish government is market-oriented, trying to build up reputation for its 
privatization policy over time by underpricing, selling a high fraction at the initial offer and 
underpricing more when selling to domestic retail investors. 
28 See Clemenz in Austrian Parliament (2000). As a norm, deadlines should be valid for the 
setting of concepts, but not for specific privatization projects. However, from a polito-
economic point of view, the latter serves a better de-synchronization with election dates. 
29 Nowotny 1998, p. 38, and Schaffhauser-Linzatti (2003) describe how Austria has reacted to 
specific EU-directives. A dominant share of liberalization and deregulation took place in 
Austria with an eye on the obligation to meet EU-standards. This led to an abolishment of state 
monopolies and the creation of market competition even in cases of alleged natural monopolies 
and, thus, had appositive impact on the speed of privatization. See Clemenz (1999), p. 17. 
30 This question has already been raised by Aiginger (1997), p. 351, with respect to the very 
early second privatization wave in Austria in the second half of the eighties and answered as 
follows: “Sie war durch den Regierungseintritt der ÖVP initiiert und wohl wegen der 
Budgetengpässe durchsetzbar”. Analogously, Jeronimo, Pagan and Soydemir (2000) analyze 
whether deficits and indebtedness in the 1990s in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece were 
associated with a shift from privatization as a tool of economic restructuring, to privatization as 
a tool of European monetary convergence. Their empirical results suggest that privatization 
funds accruing from the sale of state-owned enterprises in the Southern European countries 
might have been used to tackle budget deficits and meet the stringent debt criterion for 
monetary integration. 
31 See, among others, Clemenz (1999), p. 1. 
32 However, even under the “New Austrian Public Policies” the EU commitment could not 
prevent the emergence of a political cycle. Even shortly after the Maastricht Treaty came into 
force, Austrian government deficits and debt increased systematically for three consecutive 
years before the general elections of 1994. See, e.g., Clemenz, 1999,  p. 4.  
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